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Foxes and Chickens: Do Borrowers Have a Private
Cause of Action Against Farm Credit
System Institutions?
Sarah K. Reesman*
Don and Mary Redd are Farm Credit System (FCS) borrow-
ers. This Missouri farm family obtained a loan, secured by their
farm, from the Federal Land Bank of St. Louis (FLB) in 1972.
Due to conditions beyond their control-several years of ex-
tremely low farm commodity prices, high interest rates, high pro-
duction costs, and severe weather-the Redds were unable to
make all scheduled loan payments.
Although the farmers developed a plan which they asserted
could bring them up to date in their payments,' the FLB refused
to consider forbearance, debt restructuring, or any of the borrow-
ers' rights given under the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985.2
When the Redds attempted to enforce their rights in federal dis-
trict court,3 the case was dismissed, in part because the statute did
not explicitly provide a private cause of action and the court re-
fused to imply a private right to sue the FCS.4
The Redds typify the problems of the many other farmers
like them who are unable to repay their original FCS loans due to
circumstances beyond their control.
I. Introduction
The government has long played a vital role in assisting the
agricultural sector of the United States. Although the spirit of
* B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia (1986); J.D., University of Minnesota
Law School (1989). The author would like to thank Dale Reesman and Farmers'
Legal Action Group, Inc. for their help and support.
1. The Redds proposed to sell off a portion of their land, thereby reducing
their debt, and to obtain Farmers Home Administration financing or loan guaran-
tees. Brief for Plaintiff at 4, Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 661 F. Supp. 861 (E.D.
Mo. 1987), off'd, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
3. Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 661 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Mo. 1987), off'd, 851
F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988).
4. Id. at 862.
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helping farmers remain self-sufficient continues, program imple-
mentation often changes with various administrations and eco-
nomic climates.
The Farm Credit Administration (FCA) is a government cre-
ation designed to help farmers obtain credit for operations and
land purchases. The original purpose of the FCA was the estab-
lishment of an institution owned and operated by the borrowers,
through which they could help themselves rather than relying on
direct government assistance.5 In the past few years, however, the
FCA has been moving away from this structure towards a policy of
less available money and less member control. The free spending,
easy credit seventies have given way to a decade of tight money
and high interest rates. Such tight money policies, combined with
a dramatic drop in the value of farm land, have created a situation
where farmers are deeply indebted and loans are severely
undersecured.
While Congress has made several attempts to assist the
farmer/borrower, agency interpretation of the statutes often
thwarts these attempts. Because the Farm Credit System, which
implements FCA policies, is not a system of government agencies
but only government-affiliated entities,6 it is difficult to determine
whether their actions are reviewable by the federal courts.
The courts have also had difficulty determining congressional
intent regarding borrowers' rights. The Farm Credit Amendments
Act of 1985 (1985 Amendments) 7 recently renewed the controversy
over borrowers' rights. The basic argument continues to be
whether a borrower is allowed to sue an FCS entity in federal
court for enforcement of protections provided by Congress, partic-
ularly for equitable relief.
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (1987 Act),8 passed in
early January of 1988,9 not only restructures the FCS and gives
5. Farmer participation and control was expanded at the district level by the
Farm Credit Act of 1953; it gave borrowers the authority to elect six of the seven
members of each of the twelve district farm credit boards. Farm Credit Act of 1953,
ch. 335, § 14, 67 Stat. 390, 396 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). Decentralization continued with the Farm Credit Act of 1971. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2001(b) (1982) stated "It is the objective of this Act to continue to encourage
farmer- and rancher-borrowers participation in the management, control, and own-
ership of a permanent system of credit for agriculture which will be responsive to
the credit needs of all types of agricultural producers having a basis for credit .. "
6. See Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001, 2241 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
7. Pub. L. No. 99-205.
8. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
9. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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assistance to the System, it also includes additional borrowers'
rights. But, rather than clarifying the question whether a bor-
rower can sue and FCS entity in federal court, the 1987 Act has
only added fuel to the fire started by the 1985 Amendments by not
mentioning the borrowers' right to a private cause of action.
The potential for continued problems for farmers is great if
the FCS is to police itself in enforcing borrowers' rights and bor-
rowers have no neutral court in which to have grievances heard.1o
This article traces the development of the Farm Credit System. It
focuses especially on borrowers' rights: where they exist, how they
can be enforced, and what the effect might be of the 1985 Amend-
ments and the 1987 Act.
II. History of the Farm Credit System
The history of government assistance to farmers can be
traced to the early 1900s, when both President Woodrow Wilson
and the Southern Commercial Congress, a non-governmental or-
ganization, created commissions to study European cooperative
credit systems." After studying the proposals offered by the two
commissions, Congress adopted a system based on a combination of
methods used by European countries.' 2
The FCS, which implements FCA programs, is comprised of
several entities, all performing various credit functions.' 3 Origi-
nally, there were federal land bank associations (FLBAs) at the lo-
cal level,' 4 from which farmers would borrow money. To do so
farmers were required to buy stock in the FLBA's supervising fed-
eral land bank (FLB) district.15 There were also Federal Interme-
10. See infra pp. 66-68 for examples of the FCS' noncompliance with both the
1985 and 1987 laws.
11. John R. Brake, A Perspective on Federal Involvement in Agricultural
Credit Programs, 19 S.D.L. Rev. 567, 568 (1974).
12. The two methods used were from the Landschaften banks of Germany and
the organization of Raiffeisen banks in Europe. The Landschaften banks obtained
loan funds through the sale of mortgage bonds to investors, the method employed
by FLBs and Federal Intermediate Credit Banks. The Raiffeisen banks, using an
approach similar to modern day credit unions, loaned money deposited by members
to other members at favorable rates. The Raiffeisen method was adopted by the
local FLBAs and Production Credit Associations. Id. at 568.
13. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2260 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
14. Most FLBAs served several counties.
15. There were 12 FLB districts covering the United States and Puerto Rico,
each with several FLBAs. Although the FLBs were originally capitalized with nine
million dollars in government stock, Congress' intent was that the farmer/borrow-
ers should own and control the institutions. This prompted the requirement of bor-
rowers buying stock. Caitlin F. Collier-Wise & Patrick Duffy, The Congressional
Response to a Crisis in Agricultural Credit The 1985 Farm Credit Amendments, 31
S.D.L. Rev. 471 (1986).
1988]
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diate Credit Banks (FICBs),16 which, along with Production Credit
Associations (PCAs),17 offered discounted loans with the interest
deducted in advance to commercial lenders, making agricultural
loans more appealing. The 1987 Act called for major changes in
the structure of the FCS, however.' 8 The FLBs and FICBs were
merged into new Farm Credit Banks.19 PCAs and FLBAs were
also merged.20 Finally, the number of FCS districts was cut in
half.21 At this time one Federal Land Bank has already been
closed and several others are having serious difficulties due to fi-
nancial problems.22
IIl. Recent Legislation
A. The Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985
In 1985, major revisions were made to the 1971 Farm Credit
Act, in an attempt to bolster a weakened FCS and to increase bor-
rower protection.23 The Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985
consists of four titles.2 4
Title III of the Amendments Act is captioned "Protection for
Farmers and Other Farm Credit Borrowers." 25 Section 301(b)26
16. There were also 12 district FICBs.
17. The main function of PCAs was to provide operating loans to farmers for
expenses generated during crop production. These loans were scheduled to be re-
paid at the end of the crop season, although some intermediate term credit was
available for up to seven to ten years. C.W.S. Home, Sources of Agricultural Fi-
nancing With an Emphasis on the Farm Credit System, 1981-1982 Agric. L.J. 15,
21.
18. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
19. Id. § 410.
20. Id. § 411.
21. Id. § 412.
22. The Federal Land Bank of Jackson closed May 20, 1988. The Federal Land
Banks of St. Paul, Minnesota and Louisville, Kentucky are also reportedly in
trouble. Farm Credit Agency Shuts a Land Bank, Wall Street J., May 23, 1988 at 4,
col. 1.
23. Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
24. The first provision gives the system greater authority to build itself back up
using its own resources. A new institution, the Farm Credit System Capital Corpo-
ration, was created to provide a central source of financial assistance to the various
system institutions, and serve as a "warehouse" to which they could sell the prop-
erty and delinquent loans. The Capital Corporation could then restructure or
guarantee the loans and adjust borrowers' debts. Along the same lines, the second
provision makes the FCA a "stronger, arms' length regulator of the system." Title
III provides greater protection for borrowers under the system, and the final sec-
tion gives the Secretary of the Treasury discretionary power to shore up the sys-
tem's finances through purchasing obligations of the Capital Corporation. Id.
25. Id.
26. 12 U.S.C. § 2199 (Supp. IV 1986).
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requires disclosure of loan information, such as the current rate,
the amount and frequency by which a variable interest rate can in-
crease, and "any [other] change in the interest rate applicable to
the borrower's loan."27 Borrowers are to receive a copy of the for-
bearance policy, which would give the FCS the option of waiting
for past due payments in certain circumstances. Borrowers are
also entitled to copies of all documents they signed at the time of
execution of the loan.28 Title III goes on to establish credit review
committees, which include farmers, to review loan applications. 29
Finally, the provision calls for a review of each loan that has been
placed in non-accrual status to determine if the loan could be re-
structured under the Act and its amendments.3 0
Regulations implementing these new borrower rights were
published for comment by the FCA in May of 1986,31 and follow-
ing a comment period,3 2 regulations were finalized on October 28,
1986.33 The Governor of the FCA had previously stated that no
regulations were necessary for several sections of the statute, in-
cluding the provision describing the information to which borrow-
ers are entitled and that dealing with actions on loan applications.
These provisions became effective immediately. 34 The October
regulations were given a November 28, 1986 effective date, eleven
months after the passage of the Act.
The major problem arising out of this legislation and the reg-
ulations implementing it is whether borrowers under the FCS
have a private cause of action to enforce the rights given them.
FCA claims that the only relief afforded borrowers is through the
agency's own appeals system, as provided in section 303 of the 1985
Act.w This view is supported by several pre-Amendments cases.
36
However, the legislative history and other post-Amendments cases
27. Id.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 2200 (Supp. IV 1986).
29. 12 U.S.C. § 2202 (Supp. IV 1985).
30. Loans designated as having a non-accrual status are those which are due,
but have not yet been paid.
31. 51 Fed. Reg. 17,034 (1986) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. § 1747).
32. Proposed regulations are published by the agency, then interested parties
are given an opportunity to comment on the regulations for a certain period of time
before the final regulations are published. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Included among
the comments to these particular regulations was a letter from the Attorneys Gen-
eral of several midwestern states: Hubert H. Humphrey (Minnesota), Neil F. Harti-
gan (Illinois), Thomas L. Miller (Iowa), Robert T. Stephan (Kansas), Nicholas
Spaeth (North Dakota), and Bronson C. LaFollette (Wisconsin).
33. 51 Fed. Reg. 39,486 (1986) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 614, 615, 618).
34. Farm Credit Admin., News Release, Farm Credit Administration Takes Ac-
tion to Implement Farm Credit Act Amendments (Feb. 14, 1986).
35. "The board of directors of each Farm Credit System institution shall estab-
lish one or more credit review committee(s) .... Any loan applicant who has re-
1988]
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point to a private cause of action.3 7
B. The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987
The 1987 Act38 continued the major overhaul of the FCS be-
gun by the 1985 Amendments,39 and also strengthened the rights
available to borrowers.40
Title I of the Act, "Assistance to Farm Credit System Bor-
rowers," includes protection of borrower stock,41 restructuring of
distressed loans,42 access to documents and information,4 3 and a
right of first refusal on property acquired by the FCS in a
foreclosure.'4
Of particular assistance to farmers are the sections on re-
structuring and the right of first refusal. Under the Act, the FCS
must allow borrowers to submit an application for restructuring
which modifies the loan obligation in such a way that makes it
"probable that the operations of the borrower will become finan-
cially viable." 4 5  The Act specifically mentions rescheduling,
reamortization, renewal, and deferral of payments.46 In general, if
the cost of restructuring is less for the FCS than the cost of fore-
closure, the loan must be restructured. 47 It is possible restructur-
ing may be cheaper for the FCS because a huge drop in the value
of land, which is the usual security for loans, makes it impossible
to collect the entire debt by the traditional method of foreclosure
ceived written notice.. .of a decision to deny or reduce the loan applied for.. .may
obtain a review of such decision...before the... committee."
36. Smith v. Russellville Prod. Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1985);
Spring Water Dairy, Inc. v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 625 F. Supp. 713 (D.
Minn. 1986); Apple v. Miami Valley Prod. Credit Ass'n, 614 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Ohio
1985); Bowling v. Block, 602 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ohio 1985), off'd, 785 F.2d 556 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bower v. Lyng, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); Hartman v. Farm-
ers Prod. Credit Ass'n, 628 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
37. 131 Cong. Rec. H11,518-19 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985) (Comments by Rep. de la
Garza) Mendel v. Production Credit Ass'n, 656 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.D. 1987); Aber-
deen Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Jarrett Ranches, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 534 (D.S.D. 1986);
Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1987); Federal Land Bank v.
Halverson, 392 N.W.2d'77 (N.D. 1986).
38. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
39. Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
40. Pub. L. No. 100-233, §§ 101-110, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988).
41. Pub. L. No. 100-233, § 101, 101 Stat. 1568, 1572 (1988).
42. Pub. L. No. 100-233, § 102, 101 Stat. 1568, 1574 (1988).
43. Pub. L. No. 100-233, § 104, 101 Stat. 1568, 1579 (1988).
44. Pub. L. No. 100-233, § 108, 101 Stat. 1568, 1582 (1988).
45. 12 U.S.C.S. § 2202a(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp 1988).
46. Id.
47. Id. § 2202a(e)(1).
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and sale. The restructuring provision also requires that borrowers
be given forty-five days notice and that their restructuring applica-
tion be considered before the lender may begin or continue
foreclosure.48
With a right of first refusal, previous owners may buy back
their property for the appraised market value or offer to purchase
it for a lesser amount before the lender sells the property to a
third party.49 The Act extends the right of first refusal to borrow-
ers whose land is acquired by the lender through foreclosure or
voluntary conveyance. It includes borrowers who did not have suf-
ficient financial resources to avoid foreclosure, as determined by
the lender.50
Although an explicit private cause of action was not included
in the 1987 Act, some courts have already taken a more enlight-
ened view on that subject under the 1987 Act than those interpret-
ing the 1985 Amendments. In both Leckband v. Federal Land
Bank,51 and Harper v. Federal Land Bank,52 the courts found bor-
rowers did have a right to sue if proper borrower protections were
not afforded them.53 This view is also substantiated by the legisla-
tive history of the 1987 Act.54
Final regulations for the Farm Credit portion of the 1987 Act
were published on September 14, 1988.55 Their publication could
either help alleviate confusion or create the need for further
litigation.
48. Id. § 2202a(b)(2-3).
49. Id. § 2219a(a).
50. Id.
51. Civ. No. 3-88-167 (D. Minn. May 17, 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-5301 MN
(8th Cir. July 18, 1988). This Minnesota class action law suit deals with the right of
first refusal.
52. 692 F. Supp. 1244 (D, Ore. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-4033 (9th Cir. July
26, 1988). This case, currently under consideration for class certification which
would include certain borrowers in the 12th Federal Land Bank district (Spokane),
deals with the right to apply and be considered for restructuring.
53. See also Transcript of Court's Order, Martinson v. Federal Land Bank, No.
A2 88-31 (D.N.D. April 21, 1988) (court held the right of first refusal provisions ap-
ply to all property an FCS lender chooses to sell), appeal docketed, No. 88-5202 ND
(8th Cir. May 20, 1988) Stainback v. Federal Land Bank, Civ. No. GC 88-25-NBO
(N.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 1988) (set for trial) (court held that despite the discharge in
bankruptcy, the Stainbacks were entitled to loan restructuring consideration); In re
Dilsaver, 17 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 785 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988) (appeal pending)
(FLB must offer restructuring consideration to borrowers prior to obtaining the re-
quested relief from a stay of collecting rents and profits on mortgaged land).
54. 133 Cong. Rec. S16,995 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1987) (comments by Sen. Burdick);
133 Cong. Rec. H7,693 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1987) (comments by Rep. de la Garza).
See the discussion of the Cort v. Ash test, infra pp. 70-81.




As noted above, the Redd family provides a good example of
the problems which often befall FCS borrowers. After receiving
notice that their farm would be sold at public auction, the Redds
attempted to enjoin the foreclosure until they could be considered
for Title III rights.56 The district court held that the Redds had no
private cause of action.5 7 The court relied on legislative history
and mistakenly concluded that Congress had debated and dropped
such a remedy before the statute passed.58 The debate upon which
the court relied, however, concerned enforcement powers given
the FCA to reprimand its own employees, not remedies for bor-
rowers wronged by the System. The court also held that the ad-
ministrative remedies available through the agency appeals
process were adequate.5 9 The Redds had argued vigorously against
this point claiming that Congress had recognized the crises and the
conflict of interest which had resulted in tension between the Sys-
tem and its borrowers.60 As stated in their brief, "[i]t is highly un-
likely that Congress, under such circumstances, would appoint the
fox as the sole guardian of the chicken coop." 6 '
The Redds then filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code to prevent foreclosure while they appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.62
The court of appeals limited its decision to the issue of whether
the 1985 Amendments contain an implied private cause of action
for damages. 6 3 The FLB acknowledged that if the Redds' bank-
ruptcy plan was confirmed, there would be no need for foreclo-
56. Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 851 F.2d 219, 220 (8th Cir. 1988).
57. Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 661 F. Supp. 861, 862 (E.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd 851
F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988).
58. Id. at 863.
Mr. Glickman offered an amendment that would hold directors and of-
ficers of the System personally and individually liable for damages suf-
fered when they knowingly violate this Act, or any rate regulation or
order issued thereunder. It was pointed out that such severe penalties
would discourage persons from serving as directors or officers. In ad-
dition, the bonding costs would add a considerable burden and cost to
these institutions, if such bonds were to equal those or [sic] commer-
cial-for-profit institutions. It was also pointed out that various other
legal remedies already exist to address this matter.
Id. (Quoting H.R. Rep. No. 425, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 2587, 2631).
59. Id.
60. H.R. Rep. No. 425, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 2587, 2598 [hereinafter House Report 4251.
61. Appellants' Reply Brief at 3, Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 851 F.2d 219 (8th
Cir. 1988).
62. Redd, 851 F.2d at 220.
63. Id. at 219.
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sure.64 It also conceded that if the bankruptcy proceeding was
dismissed, the foreclosure would be governed by the 1987 Act.65
The court decided, however, that the Redds could not recover
damages. Dismissing comments made during floor debate of the
Amendments as not controlling, the three-judge panel held that
money damages were "inconsistent with the underlying purpose of
the 1985 amendments."66 Therefore, the question of whether in-
junctive relief is available under the 1985 Amendments was left
explicitly unanswered by the Redd court.67
Many other farmers have found themselves in situations sim-
ilar to that of the Redds. The Halversons had a good repayment
record until March of 1984 and had continued to make partial pay-
ments through December of that year. Five straight years of bad
weather-rain, hail, frost, and drought--and low prices prevented
them from staying current on their payments. Despite their previ-
ously good record, their FLB refused any type of forbearance. 68
Another farm family, the Overboes, met similar resistance
when, after falling behind on their loan payments, they asked that
their payment date be changed from July to December. This
would have better accommodated their cash flow needs because,
like most farmers, their money was tied up in crops during the
summer growing season. The local FLB refused.69
The 1987 Act has not changed the attitude of the FCS. The
System still seems determined to keep the farmers off the land,
even if allowing them to stay costs the FCS the same or even less
than selling to a third party.
One example is the Leckbands' situation.70 There, the FLB
interpreted 12 U.S.C. § 1229a to say there was no right of first re-
fusal if the land was sold at public auction. The Leckbands argued
that the statute gave them such rights whether the land was sold
by public sale or otherwise.7 1 The court found that the right of
first refusal created by section 1229a (b) "comes into being when
the seller first elects to sell the property." 72 Therefore, the FLB
64. Id. at 220.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 223.
67. But see Zajac v. Federal Land Bank, Civ. No. A3-88-115 (D.N.D. July 19,
1988) (decided under the 1987 Act, held there was no implied cause of action for
damages, and, by inference no injunctive relief based on Redd, a case decided under
the 1985 Amendments), appeal docketed, No. 88-5353 ND (8th Cir. Aug. 15, 1988);
See also infra pp. 82-83.
68. Federal Land Bank v. Halverson, 392 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1986).
69. Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1987).
70. Civ. No. 3-88-167 (D. Minn. May 17, 1988).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3.
19881
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must offer the right at that time, the type of sale being
irrelevant.73
An Oregon farm family, the Harpers, met similar resistance
when they attempted to apply for restructuring of their FLB
loans. In this case,74 the FLB had obtained a default judgment of
foreclosure in state court, before the January 6, 1988 passage of the
1987 Act. A sheriff's sale was held in March of 1988, but the Harp-
ers retained redemption rights. The FLB contended that because
the foreclosure judgment occurred before the Act, the Harpers did
not qualify for borrower protection.75 The court held, however,
that since the statute said "no qualified lender may foreclose or
continue any foreclosure proceeding. "76 the Harpers must be
considered for restructuring.77
These cases, and many others, illustrate a common practice of
the FCS. The System often uses immediate foreclosure to collect a
small percentage of the amount owed rather than working with a
borrower, using some form of debt adjustment, to receive a greater
amount on a revised schedule. 78
IV. Pre-Amendment Interpretation
Relevant case law, involving situations occurring before the
1985 Amendments, is nearly unanimous in holding that there is no
private cause of action as a remedy under the Farm Credit Act of
1971.79 Most cases use language such as that found in Brekke v.
Volcker.80 The court held that because the Act did not "contain an
express provision granting such a right"81 and because several
other courts had denied an implied cause of action, they would do
the same.8 2
A recent case, Production Credit Association v. VanIperen, 8 3
73. Id. at 4.
74. Harper v. Federal Land Bank, 692 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Ore. 1988), appeal dock-
eted, No. 88-4033 (9th Cir. July 26, 1988)
75. Id. at 1246.
76. 12 U.S.C.S. § 2202a(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (emphasis supplied).
77. Harper, 692 F. Supp. at 1249.
78. See also Federal Land Bank v. Hopman, 658 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Ark. 1987),
Mendel v. Production Credit Ass'n, 656 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.D. 1987), Brekke v. Vol-
ker, 652 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mont. 1987); Production Credit Ass'n v. VanIperen, 396
N.W.2d 35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
79. See, e.g., Bowling v. Block, 785 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied sub
norm., Bower v. Lyng, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); Smith v. Russellville Prod. Credit Ass'n,
777 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) Vanlperen, 396 N.W.2d 35.
80. 652 F. Supp. 651 (D. Mont. 1987).
81. Id. at 654.
82. Id.
83. 396 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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held that the Farm Credit Act did not create a private cause of ac-
tion for those injured by a System institution.8 4 This case asserts
that the plaintiff has a cause of action in state court, however,
under the common law.85 A right to be heard in state court does
provide some chance for relief-when the agency had regulations
but failed to follow them. Thus, under Vanlperen a borrower pos-
sesses a common law defense against foreclosure.
A problem with this remedy can occur, however, in a case
such as Redd. The Redds filed suit in state court just days before
foreclosure proceedings on their property were to commence. The
FCS removed the case to federal court, where a motion for a tem-
porary restraining order (TRO) to stop foreclosure was denied.8 6
As the Redds could not address their state law claims until their
federal claims were dismissed much later, they were forced to file
for bankruptcy to avoid foreclosure. 87 This jurisdictional problem
makes state relief ineffective.
In another case, although the court decided against the
farmer, it did note two things "significant to the analysis of the
1985 Act.... and which make the earlier [pre-Amendments] line of
cases distinguishable."8 8  The farmer in Aberdeen Production
Credit Association v. Jarrett Ranches, Inc. 89 had alleged no facts or
claims which arose after the passage of the 1985 Act. But, the
court noted, "[w]ith the exception of any rights purportedly estab-
lished under the 1985 Farm Credit Amendments Act, the statute
creates no entitlement for farmer borrowers other than the right
to reasons for denial and an informal hearing for unsuccessful loan
applicants." 90
The type of relief sought is another distinguishing factor in
the cases finding there is no private cause of action. Monetary
damages seem to require explicit language affording such protec-
tion. Equitable rights, however, can be implied. Although Mendel
v. Production Credit Association,91 one of the few cases brought
under the 1985 Amendments, held that a private cause of action
for damages was inconsistent with the purposes of the Amend-
84. Id. at 36.
85. Id.
86. Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 661 F. Supp. 861 (E.D.
Mo. 1987), affl'd, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988).
87. Id.
88. James T. Massey, Farm Credit System Borrowers' Rights-Are They En-
forceable?, 2 Farmers' Legal Action Rep. 1 (Jan./Feb. 1987).
89. 638 F. Supp. 534 (D.S.D. 1986).
90. Id. at 537 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202).
91. 656 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.D. 1987).
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ments,9 2 the court did not consider equitable relief. The court in-
stead denied damages, finding that Congress was attempting to
stabilize a financially unstable System.93 The court's discussion
did not apply to a plea for equitable relief. In another case, based
on pre-Amendments actions, the court found that although there
was no implied right of action for damages, "courts have recog-
nized that federal regulations which have been held not to imply a
private cause of action may nevertheless afford a basis for an equi-
table defense to a foreclosure action." 94 The courts have thus left
the door open to equitable relief.
In Federal Land Bank v. Halverson,95 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota held that, under facts occurring before the 1985
Amendments, the failure of a federal land bank to comply with
the administrative forbearance regulation and policies gives rise to
a valid equitable defense to a foreclosure action under state law.96
The court went on to say that the "close correspondence" between
the Amendments' language and comments by Representative de
la Garza on the House floor suggests that the Representative's re-
marks should be considered in interpreting the language.97
V. Cort v. Ash 98 Analysis
Further support for the proposition that farmers have a pri-
vate cause of action against the FCA/FCS is found in Cort v. Ash, a
1975 United States Supreme Court case which sets the standard
for deciding generally "whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not providing one." 99 The case sets out four factors for
making such a determination:
1. [I]s the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted?;
2. [I]s there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?;
3. [I]s it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?;
4. [I]s the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law.., so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause
of action based solely on federal law?1° °
92. Id. at 1216.
93. Id.
94. Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445, 448 (N.D. 1987).
95. 392 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1986).
96. Id. at 81.
97. Id. at 86.
98. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
99. Id. at 78.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
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A. Farmer/Borrowers Are Members of the Protected Class
In going through the test step by step, using Title III of the
1985 Amendments, the first discussion is whether farmers who
have been denied notice or other rights set out under the Act are
of the class Congress intended to benefit. Mendel v. Production
Credit Association,'Ol speaks directly to that question, holding,
"[b]y its terms, therefore, the 1985 Amendments were designed to
benefit the special class of farmer/borrowers having difficulty pay-
ing their debts and receiving additional financing, and the Mendels
are a member of that class."1
02
Additional support for Mendel's proposition is found in ear-
lier cases. By the 1930s, most courts held that if a statute favored a
certain class, members of that class had the right to go to court to
remedy a breach of that statute.103 That view has changed dramat-
ically as a result of increased litigation and overcrowded court
dockets. The courts, therefore, are increasingly reluctant to find
an implied right of action without very clear congressional support
for such a decision. 0 4 For example, in 1979, Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington 10 5 held that section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 gives no private cause of action, because the intent was
to provide the Securities Exchange Commission with an early
warning to protect investors, not to provide investors a vehicle
with which to sue for damages. This made it obvious that inves-
tors were not the group Congress intended to benefit from the leg-
islation. In the same year, however, the Supreme Court decided
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis in which a statute
prohibited certain conduct and declared void any contracts made
through such conduct, but did not expressly mention enforce-
ment.106 Without reference to legislative history, the Supreme
Court found an implied right of action for rescission, injunctive re-
lief, and restitution. The Court went on to hold that, "[t]he very
least Congress must have assumed [is] that [the void contracts]
could be raised defensively in private litigation. .. "107 and con-
cluded that the statutory language itself implied a right to judicial
relief. This was despite the fact that no civil liabilities allowing
101. 656 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.D. 1987).
102. 656 F. Supp. at 1216.
103. Comment, Implied Private Rights of Action: The Courts Search for Limita-
tions in a Confused Area of the Law, 13 Cumb. L. Rev. 569 (1983).
104. Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Statutes: Congres-
sional Intent Judicial Deference, or Mutual Abdication?, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 611,
613 (1982).
105. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
106. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
107. Id. at 18.
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damages were created by the Act. The difference seems to be that
the plaintiffs in Transamerica were intended beneficiaries of the
statutory protections.
In the case of the 1985 Amendments, the FCS argues that Ti-
tle III was intended for the benefit of the Farm Credit System, and
that forbearance and the internal appeals process were meant to
strengthen the institutions, not to help the individual borrow-
ers.1 08 This argument is based mainly on the enforcement powers
given the FCA, under other sections of the Amendments, which
allow them to issue cease and desist orders and suspend or remove
recalcitrant directors or officers.109 Although the House Commit-
tee on Agriculture rejected an amendment which would have au-
thorized damage actions against System officers and directors,
these provisions dealt with the FCA's disciplinary powers over its
own employees, and had nothing to do with the borrowers."i 0
There are no published regulations giving instructions for seeking
a cease and desist order. This makes it impossible for a borrower
to enforce his rights by that method, if it was meant to be the
proper avenue.
As Congress was creating new "protection" for the special
class of FCS borrowers, allegedly to ensure fairness, it seems un-
likely that the only enforcement power and source of relief would
be left to the FCA. A footnote in Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago"' addresses this issue, saying that although the Court had
"sometimes refuse[d] to imply private rights of action where ad-
ministrative or like remedies are expressly available," if the "stat-
ute explicitly confers a benefit on a class of persons and where it
does not assure those persons the ability to activate and participate
in the administrative process" it would not withhold such a rem-
edy. 1 2 Leaving protection only to the FCS is especially unrealistic
as Congress noted the "tensions" created between the System and
its borrowers by financial difficulties."i 3 The fact that so many
borrowers must resort to court action to receive rights guaranteed
by law demonstrates the folly of thinking the FCS can police itself.
Therefore, farmer/borrowers must be the intended class.
108. Brief for Appellees at i, Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.
1988).
109. House Report 425, supra note 60, at 2598.
110. Id.
111. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
112. Id. at 707 n.41.
113. House Report 425, supra note 60, at 2598.
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B. Congress Intended an Implied Cause of Action for
Farmer/Borrowers
The second factor in the Cort v. Ash test concerns the legisla-
tive intent behind a statute. Some recent decisions have been
based almost entirely on this criterion, with the other elements
enunciated in Cart virtually ignored.114 The original interpreta-
tion of the legislative intent factor in Cort was that a positive
showing of congressional intent would be required for a private
cause of action to be implied. This completely overruled an earlier
notion that Congress had to expressly disallow a private action
within the wording of a statute for that remedy to be unavaila-
ble."5 Touche Ross & Co. bases its decision in large part on the
fact that the relevant provision was flanked by other sections
which explicitly provide a private right of action. This led to the
conclusion that, "when Congress wished to provide a private dam-
ages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."" 6 Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, "expressly subordinated"
the third and fourth factors, and found that if the first two factors
were not satisfied, that was enough to deny an implied private
right of action." 7
In the same year that Touche Ross & Co. was decided, how-
ever, the Supreme Court also decided Cannon v. University of
Chicago,"8 which stated, "The fact that other provisions of a com-
plex statutory scheme create express remedies has not been ac-
cepted as a sufficient reason for refusing to imply an otherwise
appropriate remedy under a separate section."" 9 The Court deter-
mined that courts have tried to avoid reaching so far to discover
legislative intent, and will not do so without "other, more convinc-
ing evidence that Congress meant to exclude the remedy."' 20
More recently, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Cur-
ran,12 1 the high Court reiterated its use of legislative intent as the
most important factor, but used quite different methods in discov-
ering that intent. They noted that lower courts had upheld a pri-
vate cause of action under the pertinent law, and subsequent
114. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
115. Comment, supra note 103, at 579.
116. Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 572.
117. Note, supra note 104, at 619.
118. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
119. Id. at 711; see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
120. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 711.
121. 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
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amendments by Congress did not expressly prohibit such a right;
the Court decided the lower courts must have been correctly inter-
preting congressional intent.122
The legislative intent factor was construed much more
broadly under Curran, and that construction was carried over to a
1987 case, where Cort was not even mentioned in the majority
opinion.123 In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority, the Court found that there were only two cir-
cumstances where there was no right to sue under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983:124 "where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the
statute in the enactment itself and where the statute did not create
enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of
section 1983."125 The Court went on to say "the remedial devices
provided in [the Housing Act] are [not] sufficiently comprehen-
sive.. .to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy
of suits under section 1983,126 [and] [t]hey do not show that 'Con-
gress specifically foreclosed a remedy under section 1983.' "127 The
Wright court also stated that the availability of administrative re-
view did not preclude use of section 1983.128
More specific questions concerning intent behind statutory
law are, what is legislative history and how much weight should be
accorded various sources. An early case, Algoma Plywood & Ve-
neer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,129 held that
the court would be "wholly unjustified" in ignoring the legislative
interpretation given the statute during debate and at its passage.130
The Court relied heavily on the House and Senate committee re-
ports, as well as statements by the bill's sponsors on the floor.
122. Id. at 379-83; see also Comment, supra note 103, at 591.
123. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
124. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be statute of the District of Columbia.
125. 479 U.S. at 424; see also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
126. 479 U.S. at 424 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n., 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981)). Sea CZammers held that because the stat-
utes at issue provided "comprehensive enforcement mechanisms," including specific
statutory remedies such as citizen-suit provisions, the § 1983 right of action was not
preserved. 453 U.S. at 20.
127. 479 U.S. at 424 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004-05 n.9 (1984)).
128. 479 U.S. at 427-28.
129. 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
130. Id. at 312.
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More recently the Supreme Court reaffirmed that reasoning, hold-
ing that although the comments of one legislator are not the final
word in statutory interpretation, "remarks...of the sponsor of the
language ultimately enacted are an authoritative guide to the stat-
ute's construction."l 3 ' The Court expressed similar sentiments in
Brock v. Pierce County,132 where it held that if comments by indi-
vidual legislators are consistent with other legislative history, as
well as the language of the statute itself, "they provide evidence of
Congress' intent." 33
As discussed above, the legislative history of the Farm Credit
Amendments points toward an intent to allow private action in
federal court, beginning with the title of the relevant section. Dis-
cussion in the House of Representatives centered on providing re-
lief to FCS borrowers and institutions. The House Report found
that
[a]dditionally, the bill provides legal protection for borrowers
that is needed to ensure that they receive fair treatment and
due process, and that they are given every realistic opportunity
to avoid liquidation and stay in business.. .The bill is designed
to reduce those tensions by bolstering confidence in the Sys-
tem's financial stability and mandating fair and equitable
treatment of the borrowers. 134
The report's further statement that the Amendments would
"[p]rovide new protection for System borrowers"''i also creates an
inference that additional relief was intended.
Individual legislators also made statements indicating new
borrowers' rights were being created, including legal relief. Sena-
tor Paula Hawkins stated:
Another positive step in this legislation are a number of provi-
sions that protect farmer-borrowers of the System... [includ-
ing] this section of the legislation [which] provides for the
reconsideration of farm credit institution's action with regard
to loans that may be restructured based on changes in the cir-
cumstances of the institution as a result of the enactment of
this bill.136
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina also urged passage of the
bill because of the urgent need of both the FCS and the nation's
131. North Haven Bd. Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982); Federal Energy
Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegeta-
ble Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distill-
ers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
132. 476 U.S. 253 (1986).
133. Id. at 263.
134. House Report 425, supra note 60, at 2597-98.
135. Id. at 2588.
136. 131 Cong. Rec. S16,739 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1985).
1988]
Law and Inequality
farmers. 3 7 These comments show that congressional leaders in-
tended to provide assistance to farmers, not just to an ailing
System.
The evidence most directly related to the question of whether
borrowers have the right to go to court against the FCS came in a
discussion between Representatives Tim Penny of Minnesota and
Kika de la Garza, chairman of the House Committee on Agricul-
ture and sponsor of the bill.
Rep. PENNY: .. .I know you share with me the belief
that applicants and member-borrowers need assurances
throughout the process that they are being treated fairly. In
addition to such guidelines and regulations, will this legislation
provide [them] the option of utilizing the court system to en-
sure they are properly enforced?
Rep. DE LA GARZA: Yes, Mr. Penny, as you indicate, a
major section of this bill does establish a set of borrowers'
rights, and it would be my understanding that the rights of ap-
plicants and member-borrowers as set forth in this Act and in
the regulations of the Farm Credit Administration shall be en-
forceable in courts of law.' 38
Further evidence is found in testimony presented before a House
subcommittee, where former FCA Governor Donald Wilkinson
stated, "system institutions are borrower-owned businesses, not
government agencies. FCA believes that adequate protection of
debtor's rights are provided by the judicial process." 3 9
The legislative history for the 1987 Act also refers to the
cause of action available under the 1985 Amendments. While dis-
cussing differences between the House and Senate versions of a
"right to sue" section of the bill, Senator Quentin Burdick stated:
"This amendment is made necessary only because the House, in
their Farm Credit bill, included a right to sue provision that actu-
ally restricts the right to sue. Currently, any person has the right
to sue these two entities."140 Earlier in the year Representative de
la Garza had made a similar comment in the House: "I have no
problem with the gentleman's intention in allowing borrowers [the
right] to sue, although I think basically they have that right
now."'141 Despite this history and the caption, "Protection for
Farmers and Other Farm Credit System Borrowers," indicating in-
137. 131 Cong. Rec. S17,759-60 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1985).
138. 131 Cong. Rec. H11,518-19 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985).
139. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Information Justice and Ag-
riculture of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Nov. 15, 1985) (testimony of Donald E. Wilkinson) (on file with Law &
Inequality).
140. 133 Cong. Rec. S16,995 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1987).
141. 133 Cong. Rec. H7,693 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1987).
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creased borrowers' rights, the FCA/FCS insists in its court cases
against farmers that the Amendments are only for the benefit of
the System itself. As indicated in a brief from a recent FCS case,
the FCS argues, "[t]he primary purpose of the 1985 Amendments
was to reduce the financial stress on the farmer-owned Farm
Credit System. The forbearance policy was intended to provide ad-
ditional protection to the lender, not to delinquent borrowers.
Thus, Congress vested exclusive power to enforce the forbearance
policy in the [FCA]."142 The FCS interprets the entire 1985 Act as
relating only to the strengthening and restructuring of the System,
and feels Title III was designed to protect the lender. They point
to the fact that from a lender's perspective, foreclosure should usu-
ally be the last alternative, and therefore the policy of forbearance
would strengthen the System, and is not necessarily for borrower
protection.143
Finally, the FCS argues that Congress did not intend that
farmers should be able to enforce the forbearance policy, but in-
stead gave limited procedural rights to the borrowers through
agency appeals.144 Asserting that Congress knew how to create a
private cause of action and did not specifically do so, the System
interprets the Amendments as it does the original Act-providing
no private cause of action. Mendel v. Production Credit Associa-
tion found, however, that legislative history proved that "Congress
explicitly intended that the borrowers' rights portion of the
amendments be enforceable through a court action," and that this,
along with the language of the amendments, made it apparent that
enforceable, substantive rights were created.145 Aberdeen Produc-
tion Credit Association v. Jarrett Ranches, Inc.146 also notes the
comments in the Congressional Record, but the events in that case
occurred prior to the enactment of the Amendments, so the newer
law was not applicable.
If legislative history is to be given the most weight in decid-
ing whether a statute provides private remedies, there is certainly
strong support for arguing that Congress intended Title III of the
1985 Amendments to include a private cause of action. Even if the
discussions among individual legislators are not found to be dispos-
itive, the language in the House and Senate reports favorable to
142. Brief for Appellees at i, Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.
1988).
143. Id. at 11.
144. Id.
145. 656 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (D.S.D. 1987).
146. 638 F. Supp. 534, 537 (D.S.D. 1986).
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the allowance of a private cause of action meets the legislative in-
tent requirement of the Cort test.
C. An Implied Cause of Action Is Consistent with the
Legislative Purpose
The third Cort v. Ash factor concerns whether it would be
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislation to allow
an implied cause of action. The history of the Amendments indi-
cates four primary provisions would be amended, including one
which would "[p]rovide new protection for System borrowers."147
The FCS argues that the enforcement powers created in section
204 of the Act are carried over into Title 111.148 This part of the
statute authorizes the FCA to take enforcement actions against
System institutions and employees to ensure safe and sound opera-
tion and conformance with applicable laws.149 Only the FCA can
initiate cease and desist orders1s0 or proceedings for suspension
and removal' 5 1 if individual employees or the institution for which
they work engage in unauthorized activities. The FCS interprets
these as the exclusive remedies under the statute, precluding judi-
cial review.
The claim continues by naming assistance to the financially
troubled FCS as the main objective behind the 1985 Amendments,
making foreclosure inconsistent with the statutory purpose.152
The Amendments also restructured the FCA, making it an "arms'
length regulator."'153 The FCS argues that because the primary
purpose of the Amendments was to strengthen the System, it
makes sense for such a regulator to have exclusive responsibility
for enforcement.154
There is no doubt that the statute refers in large part to
strengthening the System internally. The Mendel v. Production
Credit Association court stated, "the 1985 Amendments major goal
was to shore up a financially unstable [FCS] .... Allowing farmer/
borrowers who were not given their Title III rights to recover sub-
stantial monetary damages is completely inconsistent with the un-
derlying purpose of the 1985 Amendments."'5 5 However, these
147. House Report 425, supra note 60, at 2588.
148. See supra pp. 76-77.
149. House Report 425, supra note 60, at 2611.
150. Id. at 2612.
151. Id. at 2612-2613.
152. Brief for Appellees at 25, Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.
1988).
153. Id.
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
155. Mendel v. Production Credit Ass'n, 656 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (D.S.D. 1987).
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arguments seem to run counter to much of the legislative history
behind the Amendments. This language does not preclude the
availability of injunctive relief, and there are many comments on
an intended right of enforcement, all of which point to a bor-
rower's right to judicial review. A counter argument set forth by
borrowers is that Congress knew that the courts were unanimous
in holding that there was no implied private right of action under
farm credit legislation prior to the 1985 Amendments.56 Knowing
that the farmer/borrower had no right of action, Congress pro-
ceeded to enact the Amendments with a significant section de-
voted to creating borrowers' rights. Arguing that the
Amendments are substantially different from the Act itself, the
borrowers state that the judicial construction of the Act should not
automatically transfer to the Amendments. 5 7 In support, it is
pointed out that Congress specifically recognized the stress and
conflict of interest which resulted in tension between the System
and its borrowers. 58
As noted in Cannon, the Supreme Court will not make a neg-
ative inference that there is Congressional intent to deny relief
simply because a complex statutory scheme creates express reme-
dies. Rather the Court has demanded "other, more convincing, ev-
idence that Congress meant to exclude the remedy." 59 In
Cannon, the Supreme Court found there was a private cause of ac-
tion. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,i 60 an im-
plied right of action for certain limited non-monetary relief was
found even though the statute specifically set out other procedures
for compliance and relief.' 6 ' Cannon reiterated that point, saying
that when a remedy is necessary or at least helpful to the accom-
plishment of the statutory purpose, the Court should be receptive
to its implication.162 As there is evidence that the chairman of the
House Committee on Agriculture, the sponsor, and several others
spoke of judicial relief and other borrowers' rights, the Amend-
ments pass the Cannon test. "[E]quitable relief can be tailored to
156. Brief for Appellants at 8, Redd, 851 F.2d 219.
157. Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank holds that "absent a clear manifestation of con-
trary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with
existing law and its judicial construction." 719 F.2d 270, 277 (8th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). The court goes on to say, however, '"Tis presumption
is especially valid where, as in the present case, the language of the statutes under
consideration is substantially identical to that of the previous statutes." 719 F.2d at
277.
158. House Report 425, supra note 60, at 2598.
159. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 711 (1979).
160. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
161. Id. at 24.
162. 441 U.S. at 703.
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be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme. "163
D. An Implied Cause of Action Does Not Interfere with
Traditional State Remedies
The final test under Cort v. Ash is whether the cause of ac-
tion is "one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law."164 The rights here
were created by the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985, mak-
ing it appropriate for them to be enforced as a matter of federal
law. An additional argument is that in states where nonjudicial
foreclosures are allowed, borrowers have no remedy if they are
precluded from raising their claims in federal court.165
On the other hand, it has been argued that state law governs
because of the statutory language. Each System institution is a cit-
izen of the state in which its principal office is located,'6 6 and sev-
eral cases have applied state law on issues of foreclosure and
fiduciary relationships between PCAs and their officers.167 While
foreclosure proceedings may be an issue under state law, the rights
in question were specific ones created by the Amendments and put
into effect by federal regulations, not general acts to be performed
under state law. Aberdeen Production Credit Association v. Jar-
rett Ranches, Inc., does state that although the defendants did not
have a federal cause of action, they were not left without a remedy
because they could still protect their rights under state law.168
The court dismissed without prejudice the defendant's claims of
breach of contract and negligence, rights traditionally enforced
under state law. The dismissal of claims brought under the newly
created Title III rights left the borrowers no recourse for those
claims.169
Each of the elements enumerated by Cort have been satisfied
by the 1985 Amendments. Farmer/borrowers are of the class for
whose benefit the law was enacted and there is clearly legislative
intent supporting a private cause of action for that class. Such a
163. Chase v. Theodore Mayer Bros., 592 F. Supp. 90, 100 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
164. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
165. Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Redd v. Federal Land Bank, 661 F. Supp. 861 (E.D.
Mo. 1987), off'd, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988).
166. 12 U.S.C. § 2258 (1982).
167. Federal Land Bank v. Warner, 292 U.S. 53, 55-57 (1934); Wilson v. Mason
State Bank, 738 F.2d 343, 345 (8th Cir. 1984); Boyster v. Roden, 628 F.2d 1121, 1125
(8th Cir. 1980).




remedy is also consistent with the statutory purpose of assisting
borrowers. Finally, a cause of action for borrowers is not one tra-
ditionally relegated to state law. Because each of the Cort factors
is met, a private cause of action exists under the 1985 Amendments
and the farmer/borrower should be allowed that right.
VI. The Effect of the 1987 Act
Although a case should be decided under the laws in effect at
the time the particular incidents occurred, the 1985 and 1987 legis-
lation is too closely intertwined to consider one without reference
to the other. As noted previously, much of the legislative history
surrounding the 1987 Act indicates a belief on the part of Congress
that FCS borrowers already enjoyed a private cause of action
against Farm Credit institutions.
In May of 1987, the 1987 Act was proposed and included an
express private cause of action.' 70 The section by section analysis
states, "[S]ection 302 adds a new section 5.38 to the Farm Credit
Act of 1971 to affirm that borrowers have a right to sue, in federal
court..."171 One of the bill's sponsors then stated:
I am particularly proud to be the sponsor of legislation that
spells out a borrowers bill of rights. The borrowers in this sys-
tem have been abused, mislead, coerced by Farm Credit Ad-
ministration banks and officials who have sought to remake
this system along new lines, but to the detriment of local con-
trol and cooperative principles. To protect against such abuses
in the future, the bill provides borrowers with specific rights,
including the following:.. .Borrowers have the right to sue in
Federal court any institution of the Farm Credit System for vi-
olating duties owed to the borrower .... 172
The bill which the Senate considered in August also contained an
express provision for a borrowers' private right of action.173 Sena-
tor David Boren explained that the bill would provide a right to
sue both the FCS and FCA and give original jurisdiction to federal
district courts. 174
After the House included an amendment granting an express
cause of action in their version of the bill,i75 the Senate reconsid-
ered the Act. Senator Burdick, feeling the House version actually
restricted borrowers' rights, proposed his own amendment.I7 6 By
170. 133 Cong. Rec. S6,105 (daily ed. May 6, 1987).
171. Id. at S6,107.
172. Id. at S6,109 (comments by Sen. Fowler).
173. 133 Cong. Rec. S11,724 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
174. Id. at S11,755.
175. 133 Cong. Rec. H7,638, 7,692 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1987).
176. 133 Cong. Rec. S16,993, S16,995 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1987); see also supra p. 76.
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using the word "borrower" to describe those with a cause of action,
Senator Burdick felt "[t]his restricts rights of persons who are not
yet borrowers, or who are former borrowers, to sue."'177 Senator
Boren stated:
I am told that the House has unduly restricted the right of the
borrower to bring suit and that that is the proposal that is in
the House bill. It would be my thought...that we would oppose
that House provision in the conference committee. That would
have much the same effect as the adoption of the Burdick
amendment would have without our attempting to write the
actual language of the amendment here on the floor at this
time.178
Senator Richard Lugar stated, "I would confirm the understanding
that.. .[w]e will in fact oppose the House amendment in confer-
ence. We understand the problem, and we would appreciate the
Senator's not pursuing this amendment on this occasion with that
assurance." 179 Consistent with their expressed intent, the Senate
opposed the House provision, and it was deleted from the final
Act.18 0
Both the House and the Senate intended that a borrower
have the right to bring a private action in federal court to enforce
the Act. However, members of Congress, particularly Representa-
tive de la Garza, Chairman of the House Agricultural Committee,
and Senators Boren and Lugar, all members of the conference
committee, were under the misperception that courts were already
accepting the farmers' right to sue.' 8 '
There have already been several cases brought by borrowers
under the 1987 Act.'8 2 In all but one case the court ruled that
there was a private cause of action for the plaintiffs for equitable
relief.'8 3 The courts relied mainly on legislative intent, which they
gleaned from various statements by legislators. 8 4
In Zajac v. Federal Land Bank,185 the Federal District Court
177. 133 Cong. Rec. S16,995 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1987).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 133 Cong. Rec. H11,820 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1987).
181. 133 Cong. Rec. H7,692-93 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1987).
182. See notes 52-53, supra and accompanying text.
183. See Zajac v. Federal Land Bank, Civ. No. A3-88-115 (D.N.D. July 19, 1988),
appeal docketed, No. 88-5353 ND (8th Cir. Aug. 15, 1988).
184. Harper v. Federal Land Bank, 642 F. Supp. 1244,12 (D. Ore. 1988), appeal
docketed, No. 88-4033 (9th Cir. July 26, 1988); Leckband v. Federal Land Bank, Civ.
No. 3-88-167 at 7-9 (D. Minn. May 17, 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-5301 MN (8th
Cir. July 18,1988); Transcript of Court's Order, Martinson v. Federal Land Bank,
No. A288-31 at 2 (D.N.D. April 21, 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-5202 ND (8th Cir.
May 20, 1988).
185. Martinson, No. A288-31 at 2.
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for the District of North Dakota found no private cause of action
under the 1987 Act, but gave little explanation. Relying on Redd, a
case under the 1985 Amendments, the court held the borrowers,
who sued under the 1987 Act, had no judicial review. 8 6 The Zajac
opinion, decided after the 1987 Act cases discussed earlier, did not
distinguish those cases or even mention them, and contained very
little analysis.
The main argument of System institutions against a private
cause of action for borrowers has been the availability of cease and
desist orders against FCS institutions and employees. 8 7 This trig-
gers the question of whether borrowers can force the FCA to issue
cease and desist orders to employees who fail to follow the statute
and regulations. This proposition is not supported by any of the
cases brought under the 1987 Act.
Authority for the proposition that private remedies are avail-
able can be found in cases against other government agencies. In
Dunlop v. Bachowski,I8 8 the Secretary of Labor was asked to bring
a civil suit to set aside a union election. When the Secretary de-
clined to do so, a defeated candidate filed suit. The Supreme Court
held that "in the absence of an express prohibition in the [statute]
the Secretary... bears the heavy burden of overcoming the strong
presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial re-
view of this decision."1 89 The Court went on to say the Secretary
failed to make a showing of "clear and convincing evidence"190
that Congress meant to prohibit all judicial review, but found a
congressional purpose to limit the scope. Finally, the Court said
the Secretary must give reasons supporting his determination, and
a court's review should be "confined to examination of the 'rea-
sons' statement."191
More recently, in Heckler v. Chaney,192 the Court provided a
more explicit review scheme. The Court found that, under sec-
tions 701-706 of the Administrative Procedures Act, any person
"adversely affected or aggrieved"193 by an agency action, or failure
to act, as long as the action is a "final agency action for which
there is no other remedy," is entitled to judicial review.194
Although the Court in Chaney declined to provide the plain-
186. Id. at 7.
187. Leckband, Civ. No. 3-88-167 at 8.
188. 421 U.S. 560 (1971).
189. Id. at 567.
190. Id. at 568.
191. Id.
192. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
193. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
194. Id. § 704.
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tiff judicial review, there are factors which distinguish the case of
the FCS borrower. The Court noted that when an agency refuses
to act, it "generally does not exercise its coercive power over an in-
dividuals liberty or property rights and thus does not infringe
upon areas that courts often are called upon to protect." 95 Most
FCS borrowers, however, stand to lose their farms, homes, and
ways of life as a result of agency action.
Although none of the courts involved in actions under the
1987 Act have accepted it to this point, there is also the argument
that both Houses of Congress had express causes of action included
in their bills but subsequently deleted those provisions. These de-
letions could be interpreted as meaning Congress consciously re-
moved that remedy for FCS borrowers. In Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 96 the Supreme Court addressed a similar situation. In
Cannon, the Court analyzed whether there is a private right of ac-
tion under Title IX of the Education Amendments which Congress
modelled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. When Con-
gress passed Title IX in 1972, it was "under the impression that Ti-
tle VI could be enforced by a private action and that Title IX
would be similarly enforceable."' 97 The Supreme Court stated
that "'the relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly per-
ceived the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of
the state of the law was.' "198 Therefore, a private right of action
was found under Title IX.
Here, as in Cannon, an implied right of action is consistent
with the intent expressed by both the House and the Senate. As
articulated in Harper v. Federal Land Bank, 99 Congress did not,
by eliminating the express language creating a private cause of ac-
tion, intend to eliminate the right, but rather to maintain a right it
thought already existed.200
If Judge Panner's reasoning under Cannon is rejected, Hart
and Sacks20i offer another option: "consider the variety of reasons
which legislators may have either for opposing a bill or simply
withholding the votes necessary." These reasons include the belief
that a bill is sound in principle but politically inexpedient, that the
bill is sound in principle but defective in material particulars, or
195. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832.
196. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
197. Id. at 710-11.
198. Id. (quoting Brown v. General Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976)).
199. 692 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Ore. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 88-4033 (9th Cir. July
26, 1988).
200. Id. at 1247-48.




action should be withheld until the problem can be attacked on a
broader front.202 The authors question how a court could ever as-
certain that a bill's failure to pass was due to one of these rea-
sons.203 Any such holding by a court would have to be supported
by the unreasonable conclusion that Congress' failure to pass a bill
can be translated into approval of a judicial decision.
Any of the above reasons could apply in the case of the FCS
borrower. Congress needed to pass a farm bill to address the many
problems plaguing American agriculture. To pass any bill there
must be "give and take," and to get any farm legislation through,
explicit language may have been removed by necessity. It is also
very possible that because of concern for the financial stability of
the System, legislators were afraid an express right of action
would give a damage remedy but had no intention of denying an
equitable remedy. Several courts have given relief as a matter of
equity under the 1985 Amendments, or suggested its availability
where an FCS lender had failed to carry out a mandatory provi-
sion of the Act.204 Legislative history indicates that Congress
maintained great concern for individual farmers and their rights.
In highlighting a letter of concerns from several key farm state
senators, Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa stated, "Any assistance
package for the Farm Credit System must directly help the strug-
gling farmer/borrower as opposed to having what some suppose
might be a legitimate end of just saving the System or helping the
System."2 05 These concerns voiced by the courts, Congress, and
other holders of public office only serve to accent the obvious
needs of farmers.
VII. Conclusion
The question of who may exercise a private cause of action
after the violation of a statutory right remains open and controver-
sial. The Supreme Court itself has not followed the Cort test
strictly, allowing lower courts to create their own formulas. The
1985 Amendments mandated major changes in the Farm Credit
System structure and in how it treated its borrowers. When the
System interpreted the Amendments as narrowly as possible, Con-
gress was again forced to pass substantial farm legislation in 1987.
Even this not so gentle nudge has failed to affect FCS policy-
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1396.
204. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1987); Fed-
eral Land Bank v. Halverson, 392 N.W.2d 77 (N.D. 1986); Aberdeen Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Jarrett Ranches, Inc. 638 F. Supp. 534 (S.D. 1986) (dictum).
205. 133 Cong. Rec. 16,926 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1987).
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farmers continue to be pushed off the land, even if it would be
cheaper for the System to allow them to remain. There will be no
end to this vindictiveness until Congress explicitly grants a private
cause of action to FCS borrowers, for both equitable and monetary
relief. Unfortunately, the 1987 Act, without such explicit language,
leaves the question open to further litigation.
The concept that a statutory right without a remedy for its
violation is an empty right has been around many years. "[I]n
every case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the ben-
efit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for
the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompence of a
wrong done to him contrary to the said law."20 6
It remains in the hands of the judiciary to decide whether the
cases of FCS borrowers will be heard by an impartial court, or left
to the fox.
206. Couch v. Steel, 3 E. & B. 402, 411, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (Q.B. 1854).
